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The Public Right to Fish and the Triumph of Colonial Dispossession in Ireland and Canada 
Sarah E Hamill 
Forthcoming in the University of British Columbia Law Review.  This version is subject to 
copyediting and should not be cited to without permission. 
Abstract 
In both late-nineteenth-century Ireland and late-twentieth-century Canada there were a cluster of 
cases which discussed the public right to fish.  A comparison of the jurisprudence in these two 
examples highlights the tacit clash between two competing legal systems seen in fishing rights 
cases; namely the common law versus pre-existing legal systems.  By comparing the two 
examples, I examine the ways in which the law can be used to challenge and withstand colonial 
assertions of power but also the ways in which courts silence or ignore these claims, even if they 
are phrased in terms the common law ought to understand.  As adaptable as the common law 
may be to local conditions, in the case of the public right to fish it was altered to suit colonial 
ends and to further the dispossession of the rightful owners of the fisheries. 
 
I - Introduction 
The public right to fish has had a strange jurisprudential history.  Decades can pass without the 
right being mentioned, only for a cluster of cases with similar facts to appear in a particular 
jurisdiction.  Such patterns of case law might not surprising given that the public right to fish is 
somewhat obscure and is hardly as important a right as, for example, the free use and enjoyment 
of property.  Perhaps we should be more surprised that there has been any litigation at all about 
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public fishing rights.  Then again, such clusters of cases might themselves be indicative of 
something else, of a broader claim centred on fishing rights. 
In this paper I focus on the jurisprudence on the public right to fish in two different 
jurisdictions at two different points in time: in turn-of-the-twentieth-century Ireland and turn-of-
the-twenty-first-century Canada.1  In both these jurisdictions at those particular times, there have 
been a spate of cases which discuss the limits and application of the public’s fishing right.  
Although, superficially, my two examples have little in common, their jurisprudence on fishing 
rights offers a window into colonial dispossession.  In fact, my reasons for focusing on these two 
jurisdictions are to do with their complimentary, yet contrasting colonial experiences.  Both 
countries, with the exception of Quebec, received the English common law in its entirety, 
including the common law’s public right to fish.  Both, at the time the English or British claimed 
sovereignty over them, had a pre-existing population which had its own laws – albeit not always 
identical across the territory as a whole2 – about land ownership and access to the fisheries which 
differed from that of England.3  Nonetheless, the native Irish were not overrun by settlers in the 
same way that the Indigenous population of Canada was. In other words, the public of the public 
right to fish was very different in the two countries.   
My reason for focusing on the particular point in time in each country is due to the 
context in which the cases about fishing rights occurred.  As the nineteenth century gave way to 
the twentieth, nationalist sentiment was on the rise in Ireland along with increasing frustration at 
                                                 
1
 For a chronological table of these cases see Appendix. 
2
 The Brehon laws never formed a unified code throughout Ireland, Hans S Pawlisch, Sir John Davies and the 
Conquest of Ireland: A Study in Legal Imperialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) at 57. Nor can 
Indigenous legal systems be said to be identical across Canada. 
3
 I say ‘England’ here as the law the British exported was the English common law – the legal system not being 
uniform throughout the United Kingdom. 
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British rule.  Questions of property, particularly land-holding were a key flashpoint at this 
moment of Irish history.  According to the common law fishing rights are a species of property 
and one which flows with the soil of the river or other body of water. Even the public right to 
fish is said to flow from the fact of Crown ownership of particular waters.4  In fact, several 
fishing rights cases from Ireland at this time hint at the broader Irish dissatisfaction with the 
British administration.   
The activism that formed the backdrop to the late-twentieth-century Canadian 
jurisprudence on the public right to fish was that of  Indigenous Peoples in Canada. These 
Peoples were and still are fighting back against several centuries of colonial oppression and 
dispossession and, by the late twentieth century, were beginning to see increased judicial and 
political recognition of their rights.  In parts of Canada, but particularly along the Pacific Coast 
of British Columbia and along the many salmon-rich rivers of that province, access to the 
fisheries was and remains a key source of settler-Indigenous conflict.5  Not surprisingly, 
                                                 
4
 Richard Barnes, “Revisiting the Public Right to Fish in British Waters” (2011) 26:3 Int’l J Marine & Coastal L 433 
at 450, 453. 
5
 See e.g., Dianne Newell, Tangled Webs of History: Indians and the Law in Canada’s Pacific Coast Fisheries 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993); Victor P Lytwyn, “Waterworld: The Aquatic Territory of the Great 
Lakes First Nations” in Dale Standen & David McNab, eds, Gin Das Winan: Documenting Aboriginal History in 
Ontario (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1996) 14; James Kenny & Bill Parenteau, ““Each Year the Indians Flexed 
Their Muscles a Little More”:  The Maliseet Defence of Aboriginal Fishing Rights on the St John River, 1945-1990” 
(2014) 95:2 Canadian Historical Review 187; Peggy J Blair, “Settling the Fisheries: Pre-Confederation Crown 
Policy in Upper Canada and the Supreme Court’s Decisions in R v Nikal and Lewis” (2001) 31 RGD 87 [Blair, 
“Settling the Fisheries”];“No Middle Ground: Ad Medium Filum Aquae, Aboriginal Fishing Rights and the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s Decisions in Nikal and Lewis” (2001) 31 RGD 515 [Blair, “No Middle Ground”]; 
Douglas C Harris, “Territoriality, Aboriginal Rights, and the Heiltsuk Spawn-on-Kelp Fishery” (2000-01) 34 UBC 
Law Rev 195 [Harris, “Territorality”]; “Indian Reserves, Aboriginal Fisheries, and the Public Right to Fish in 
British Columbia, 1876-82” in John McLaren et al, eds, Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British Settler 
Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005) 266 [Harris, “Indian Reserves”]; Douglas C Harris, Fish, Law, and 
Colonialism: The Legal Capture of Salmon in British Columbia  (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) 
[Harris, Fish, Law and Colonialism]; Landing Native Fisheries: Indian Reserves and Fishing Rights in British 
Columbia, 1849-1925 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008) [Harris, Landing Native Fisheries].  This list is not 
exhaustive. 
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questions of property and rights to land and resources were and still are a key Indigenous legal 
issue.   
One striking feature of the cases examined in this paper is the tension between the facts 
as presented and the courts’ struggle or refusal to fit the law to the facts.  I argue that this 
difficulty is a result of the inherently colonial nature of the litigation and of the need to ensure 
the integrity of the colonial legal system writ large.  In Ireland the challenge posed by claims of a 
public right to fish was squarely towards that sacred cow of the common law world: private 
property.  In Canada, the challenge was (and still is) broader and often implicitly indicted the 
Crown’s claim to sovereignty and title over unceded territory .  Yet in both countries there was 
law in the form of a statute in Ireland and a constitutional guarantee in Canada which should 
have allowed the courts to better fit the law to the facts presented to them.  That they did not, or 
would not, speaks to the colonial contexts in which the cases were decided.  But it also shows 
how the law can be a sword and a shield to defend, maintain, and justify colonial dispossession 
while also having the potential to be used to withstand and attack colonial assertions of power. In 
turn, a tacit argument in both my examples was which law should govern access to the fisheries 
and whether the common law could or would recognize pre-colonial laws, however indirectly.  
While there is an argument that some of the Crown’s treaties with Indigenous People did 
recognize pre-existing legal orders, I will not be dealing with the broader issue of treaties in this 
paper.6  Ireland did not have comparable treaties but nor did vast swathes of what is now British 
Columbia.  What is more important to note is that treaties indicate the potential for the common 
law to recognize pre-existing legal orders, even if the practice was much different.  
                                                 
6
 For more on the argument that treaties recognised Indigenous legal orders see, e.g  John Borrows, “Constitutional 
Law From a First Nation Perspective: Self-Government and the Royal Proclamation” (1994) 28 UBC L Rev 1. 
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I begin with a brief discussion of the public right to fish.  Due to constraints of space, I 
cannot fully trace its origins and history.  Instead, I raise certain questions about its accepted 
history; questions which become more important for when the right is exported to Canada. In 
particular, I focus on the claim that the right emerged with the Magna Carta. The third part 
examines the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century Irish cases to show how the common 
law courts refused to recognize a legislated deviation from the common law.  The fourth part 
examines the interaction between Indigenous fishing rights and the public right to fish in Canada.  
The fifth part unpacks what the jurisprudential history of the public right to fish means in the 
context of dispossession and claimed rights. 
 
II – The Public Right to Fish 
Under the English common law, the public has a right to fish in all tidal waters.  This right is said 
to emerge out of the Crown’s ownership of the beds of tidal waters and the fact that these beds 
are held by the Crown for the benefit of the public.  Ever since the time of the Magna Carta, or 
so the standard history goes, the Crown has been prohibited from granting out either the beds or 
their related tidal fisheries to a private person.7  In short, the public right to fish is an ancient and 
longstanding common law right.  Or at least it is provided the history is not examined too 
closely. 
Due to the limits of space I cannot set out the complete origins of the public right to fish.  
I can, however, prove that the right did not emerge with the Magna Carta.  The Magna Carta is a 
                                                 
7
 Gerard V La Forest et al, Water Law in Canada – The Atlantic Provinces (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973) at 
196. 
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deeply symbolic document which can be and has been twisted to suit a range of purposes, often 
with little basis on the text or the context in which the document was written.8  Any claim that 
the document recognises a public right to fish in tidal waters reveals an ignorance of the socio-
political context in which the Magna Carta was signed.  It was the barons who forced the 
document upon John I, not the public.   It is doubtful that there was any real ‘public’ to speak of 
at the time, given that the main differentiation in personal status was whether one was an unfree 
villein bound to the land, or a freeman.9   
Even if the Magna Carta did seek to win protections for the broader English population, 
the text of the document does not support a public right to fish.  Although a handful of scholars 
have already pointed out that the Magna Carta does not protect public fishing rights,10 many 
courts still cite to it in discussions of the public right to fish.11  When courts and scholars 
mention the Magna Carta and public fishing the two chapters usually cited are chapter sixteen: 
“No river banks shall be guarded (placed in defence) from henceforth, but such as were in 
defence in the time of King Henry;”12 and chapter twenty-three: “All fish-weirs shall be removed 
from the Thames, the Medway, and throughout the whole of England, except on the sea coast.”13    
                                                 
8
 Nicholas Vincent, “Introduction” in Nicholas Vincent, ed, The Magna Carta: The Foundation of Freedom, 1215-
2015 (London: Third Millennium Publishing, 2015) 12 at 13. 
9
 Keechang Kim, Aliens in Medieval Law: The Origins of Modern Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000) at 1-4. 
10
 Barnes, supra  note 4 at 442-43; Glenn J MacGrady, “Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: 
Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines that Don’t Hold Water” (1975) 3:4 Florida State 
UL Rev 511 at 554; James L Huffman, “Speaking of Inconvenient Truths – A History of the Public Trust Doctrine: 
(200&) 18:1 Duke Evntl L & Pol’y Forum 1 at 9-12.  
11
 See e.g. R v Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723 at 770-771, [1996] WWR 149; Anderson v Alnwick District Council, 
[1993] 3 All ER 613 at 621. 
12
 McKie v KVP Co Ltd, [1947] OR 398, [1948] 3 DLR 201, 1948 CarswellOnt 47 at para 52 [McKie]; Barnes, supra  
note 4 at 443; Mark D Walters, “Aboriginal Rights, Magna Carta, and Exclusive Rights to Fisheries in the Waters 
of Upper Canada” (1998) 23 Queen’s LJ 301 at 303.  This chapter was numbered 47 in the 1215 text, see 
http://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-english-translation#sthash.sQ2n4drD.dpuf 
13
 This chapter was numbered 33 in the 1215 text see text cited in supra  note 12. 
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The evil that chapter sixteen aimed at was the king’s sport, his right to hunt.  The English 
king has long had special rights qua king and his right of sport was one of them.14  The king’s 
barons had a duty to support the king’s sport and in the original version of the Magna Carta, 
chapter sixteen appears alongside related concerns such as building bridges to allow the king to 
pass.15  What chapter sixteen does is it limits the king’s sport to those rivers which had been used 
during the reign of Henry II.  Such limits would protect the private fishing rights in these rivers, 
not the public’s.  The confusion over Chapter Sixteen appears to stem from Sir Edward Coke 
who thought it meant no grant of inland fisheries.16  It is clear that such a reading is contrary to 
the text of the chapter. 
Meanwhile, chapter twenty-three is properly about navigation.  Prior to 1215 there had 
been a number of statutes which sought to remove fish weirs from key rivers.17  Such removals 
were not aimed at preserving or protecting the fish but protecting ships and boats’ ability to pass 
up and down the rivers.  That being said, the protection of navigation had the incidental effect of 
also protecting fish which soon led to legal confusion.  In 1472, An Act for Wears and 
Fishgarthes observed that the Magna Carta protected the passage of ships and the “Safeguard of 
all the Fry of Fish spawned within the same.”18  Such comments show the idea that the Magna 
Carta protected fish is longstanding but such protections were not the driving force behind 
chapter twenty-three, particularly not when the chapter left all coastal weirs in place.  It should 
also be noted that the Wears and Fishgarthes Act does not mention the public right to fish. 
                                                 
14
 Stuart A Moore & Hubert Stuart Moore, The History and Law of Fisheries (London: Stevens & Haynes, 1903) at 
7. 
15
 Moore & Moore, supra  note 14 at 10. See e.g. chapter twenty-three of the original text, cited in supra  note 12. 
16
 George C Oke, A Handy Book of the Fishery Laws (London: Butterworth, 1903) at 269; Coke 2 Inst C 16. Though 
here Coke is citing to an older authority which is likely doubtful, Moore & Moore supra  note 14 at 12-13. 
17
 Stuart Moore, A History of the Foreshore (London: Stevens & Haynes, 1888) at 741-743. 
18
 An Act for Wears and Fishgarthes 12 Ed IV, c 7 (1472). 
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In sum, then, the origins of the public right to fish emerge elsewhere.  It would appear 
that the public right to fish is bound up with the idea that the Crown owns the foreshore.  This 
too is a relatively modern doctrine and its first appearance seems to be in Thomas Digges’ Proofs 
of the Queen’s Interest in Lands Left by the Sea and Salt Shores thereof.19 The problem with that 
doctrine is: if the Crown did own the foreshore, then all of the weirs which the Magna Carta left 
in place would have been an invasion of the Crown’s right. Richard Barnes argues that the public 
right to fish’s history is bound up with the colonial goals of the nascent British state.20  
Assertions of Crown authority over the coast and coastal fisheries did much to encourage the 
development of a navy with fishermen providing a source of ready-made sailors.21 In turn, a 
strong navy led to a strong empire. Of course, it should also be noted that marine fish, 
particularly preserved marine fish such as cod and herring were an important trade good from the 
turn of the second millennium AD.22 
The claim of Crown ownership of the foreshore does not start to appear with any 
regularity until the reign of Charles II and, when it does, the doctrine is unsettled.  The 1664 case 
of Bulstrode v Hall held that where a river is tidal, it belongs to the king.23  Bulstrode cited to Sir 
Henry Constable’s Case from 1607,24 and to Rolle’s Abridgement in support of the king’s right.  
                                                 
19
 Thomas Digges, Proofs of the Queen’s Interest in Lands Left by the Sea and Salt Shores thereof reprinted in 
Moore, supra  note 14 at 185-211. 
20
 Barnes, supra  note 4 at 439-440. 
21
 Ibid at 440; J McDonnell, “Inland Fisheries in Medieval Yorkshire” (1981) Borthwick Papers No 60 at 28; 
Gordon Jackson, “State Concern for the Fisheries, 1485-1815” in David J Starkey, Chris Reid & Neil Ashcroft, eds, 
England’s Sea Fisheries: The Commercial Sea Fishers of England and Wales Since 1300 (London: Chatham 
Publishing, 2000) 46 at47. 
22
 For an overview of this process, including some discussion as to why this should happen see,  
James H Barrett, David Orton, Cluny Johnstone et al, “Interpreting the expansion of sea fishing in medieval Europe 
using stable isotope analysis of archaeological cod bones” (2011) 38:7 Journal of Archaeological Science 1516; D 
Serjeantson & CM Woolgar, “Fish Consumption in Medieval England” in CM Woolgar, D Serjeantson & T 
Waldron, eds, Food in Medieval England: Diet and Nutrition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)102 
23
 Bulstrode v Hall (1664), (1685) 1 Keb 532, 83 ER 1096 (KB).  See also, Bulstrode v Hall (1664), (1714) 1 Sid 
148, 82 ER 1024. The latter citation is the same case but the report is in law French and has more detail. 
24
 Sir Henry Constable’s Case (1601), 77 ER 218, 5 Co Rep 106. 
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The relevant page of Rolle’s Abridgement also cites to Constable’s Case and reads “Le soile sur 
que le mere flowe & reflowe, scilicet inter high-water marke & le low-water marke poet etre 
parcel d’manor d’un subject.”25  Constable’s Case suggests that the foreshore may be privately 
owned, and that prescription could be evidence of such ownership – a direct contraction of 
Digges’ claim. The relevant part of Constable’s Case is itself a referral to an earlier case: the 
Anonymous case from 1382 which states that the sea is part of the king’s ligeance.26 Here the 
king’s ligeance did not mean property but jurisdiction.27 It seems that following the inter-
regnum, the common law courts were confused by the dual meaning of ligeance and took it to 
mean ownership. Despite such doubtful authority, in 1668, Kirby v Gibs echoed the rule about 
Crown ownership with respect to the banks of a royal river. 28  Almost a decade later, Attorney 
General v Edwards held that “the soil of the sea is in the King as part of his inheritance, and not 
as a thing of prerogative.”29  In other words, it could be granted to private persons. Yet just two 
years prior to Edwards, Sir Matthew Hale, then Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, held that 
fishing in tidal waters belonged to everyone, but that this was a rebuttable presumption rather 
than an unshakeable rule.30  The idea that a private fishery could not bar the public does not 
appear until 1704.31   Yet, later cases continued to allow for an individual to gain private rights 
via prescription to tidal waters, apparently to the exclusion of the public. 32   
                                                 
25
 2 Roll Abr 170 (translation by author: the soil where the sea flows and reflows, that is to say between the high 
water mark and the low water mark may be part of the manor of a subject) [emphasis added]. 
26
 Anonymous (1382), 6 R II 35 (Protect 46) (CP). 
27
 For the shifting meaning of ligenace see Kim, supra  note 9 at 137-142; Ann Lyon, “From Dafydd ap Gruffydd to 
Lord Haw-Haw: The Concept of Allegiance in the Law of Treason” (2002) 33 Cambrian L Rev 35 at 40-41. 
28
 Kirby v Gibs (1668), 2 Keb 294, 84 ER 183 (KB). 
29
 Attorney General v Edwards (1676), 83 ER 125, (1803) T Raym 241. 
30
 Lord Fitzwalter’s Case (1674), 1 Mod 105, 86 ER 766 at 766-767. 
31
 At least this is the first reference I found to it.  See, Warren v Matthews (1704), 87 ER 831 at 831, 6 Mod 73 (KB) 
32
 Carter v Murcot (1768) 98 ER 127 at 128, 4 Burr 2162; Orford (Mayor of) v Richardson (1791) 100 ER 1106 at 
1107, 4 TR 438. But see Lord Chief Justice Willes’ decision in Ward v Creswell (1741) 125 ER 1165 at 1166, 
(1741) Willes 265. 
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In short, the public right to fish was far from settled.  There was a popular belief that the 
right existed and that it was longstanding,33 but the evidence suggests otherwise.  That being 
said, the veracity of the public right to fish does not particularly matter for its exportation to new 
lands, the common law can be and has been adapted to meet local conditions.  What is more 
interesting is how courts reacted to attempts to challenge or extend the right in question. 
 
III - Irish Land and Irish Rights versus English Property and English Common Law. 
Although the English common law had applied in Ireland since at least the start of the 
seventeenth century, the laws of Ireland were never completely identical to that of England, even 
after the Union of the Parliaments in 1801.  From time to time, the Parliament in Westminster 
would pass legislation specific to Ireland and in 1842 a new Fisheries Act came into force for 
Ireland.34  The Irish opposed the draft version of the Act, and the Parliamentary Debates report 
numerous petitions against it.  The Act was duly amended and those amendments included 
changes to the public right to fish.35  The Fisheries Act (Ireland) recognised a public right of 
fishing in inland waters, provided that right had existed for upwards of twenty years.  The 
public’s right was to be paramount as section 114 read, in part, “Provided always, that nothing 
herein contained shall be construed to lessen or abridge any public Right of Fishing by lawful 
Means and in lawful Seasons heretofore enjoyed and exercised within the Limits of any such 
                                                 
33
 Moore & Moore, supra  note 14 at vi, 6, 13-14.  
34
 Fisheries Act (Ireland) 5 & 6 Vict, c 106 (1842). 
35
 TM Healy, Stolen Waters: A Page in the Conquest of Ulster  (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1913) at 462. 
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several Fisheries.”36 Yet, as I show in this section, such legislative protection was rarely referred 
to by the courts, nor upheld when it was. 
 Before moving on to examine the cases it is helpful to set out some background.  
Nineteenth-century Ireland was a largely agricultural society.  Prior to the final conquest of 
Ireland in 1603 it was “a pastoral and semi-nomadic society” which centred more on the raising 
of livestock than growing crops.37  Post-conquest the landscape shifted, both out of the hands of 
the native Irish and towards a more settled, crop-based agriculture, or at least for the native Irish 
towards an agriculture and diet which was heavily dependent on potatoes.38  Fish was never the 
sole or main source of food but it was a useful supplement, particularly so during the Irish potato 
famine of 1845-1852.39   
Historic records show that fish, including salmon, were plentiful in Ireland’s rivers and 
the stocks appeared in good health in the early nineteenth century.40  By the time of the 1842 
Act, however, the fish stocks were in decline and this was the source of ample concern.41  
According to Marilyn Silverman, the 1842 Act “had three ambitious but contradictory aims: to 
increase productivity, to allow everyone to fish, and to preserve the stocks.”42  Her study of three 
rivers in the south-east of Ireland details the lengthy struggle between public fishing rights and 
private claims to these rivers during the nineteenth century.  She notes that the private owners 
moved their claims from the local magistrates to the higher courts as it was there that they stood 
                                                 
36
 Fisheries Act (Ireland), supra  note 34, s114. See also, ibid s 65. 
37
 Leslie Clarkson & Margaret Crawford, Feast and Famine: Food and Nutrition in Ireland, 1500-1920 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001) at 25. 
38
 Ibid at 86. 
39
 Ibid at 75, 80-81, 106; Marilyn Silverman, An Irish Working Class: Explorations in Political Economy and 
Hegemony, 1800-1950 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) at 150 [Silverman, An Irish Working Class]. 
40
 Silverman, An Irish Working Class, supra note 40 at 142. 
41
 Ibid at 144-45. For contemporary concerns see e.g. Herbert Francis Hore, An Inquiry into the Legislation, Control, 
and Improvement of the Salmon and Sea Fisheries of Ireland (Dublin: Hodges & Smith, 1850) esp at 1-2. 
42
 Silverman, An Irish Working Class, supra  note 40 at 147 
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a better chance of winning.43  While Silverman’s study was geographically limited, the cases 
discussed in this section are from across Ireland and show that in the fight over access to the 
fisheries private rights proved more persuasive to the courts. 
Starting in the 1850s there were a number of Irish fishing rights cases in the higher 
courts, including three which were heard by the House of Lords,44 which sought to use the 
protection offered by the public right to fish.  The Irish cases advance two arguments both of 
which challenged the accepted version of the public fishing right: first, that there were or could 
be several fisheries in tidal waters; and, second, that there was a public right to fish in inland 
waters.  The former ought to have failed, given that proving a pre-Magna Carta grant was 
impossible for much of Ireland.  While the latter ought to have won, given that proving the 
existence of a right for twenty years is relatively easy to do and certainly easier than proving a 
pre-1215 grant.  Yet, that is not what happened and, in the vast majority of cases, private rights 
won the day with a little help from the common law courts. 
The majority of these cases follow a similar pattern: they are primarily cases about 
trespass where the public right of fishing is used as a defence.45  Those who claim a private or 
several fishery try to prove their title via a range of documents and other evidence of possession.  
The evidence often had gaps or documents which contradicted each other but seeing as most 
cases were also heard by juries, it fell to the juries to declare themselves convinced or not.  These 
                                                 
43
 Ibid at 180-82.  Many of the lower court cases are unreported but for some discussion of them see, Marilyn 
Silverman, “How Custom Became a Crime on the River Nore: Fishing at Bennettsbridge, 1837-95” in William 
Murphy, ed, In the Shadow of the Steeple IX (Duchas-Tullaherin Parish Heritage Society) 66; Marilyn Silverman, 
“From Fisher to Poacher: Public Right and Private Property in the Salmon Fisheries of the River Nore in the 
Nineteenth Century” in Marilyn Silverman & PH Gulliver, eds, Approaching the Past: Historical Anthropology 
Through Irish Case Studies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992) 99 
44
 Malcomson v O’Dea (1863) 11 ER 1155, 10 HL Cas 593 [Malcomson cited to ER]; Bristow v Cormican (1878), 3 
App Cas 641 (HL) [Bristow]; Johnston v O’Neill [1911] AC 552 (HL) [Johnston]. 
45
 Wyse v Leahy (1875), 9 IRCL 384 at 388. 
AAM VERSION: DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION 
13 
 
cases only appear in the written record as the result of challenges, usually by the defendants at 
trial, to judicial decisions about the admissibility of evidence or improper jury instructions.  In 
the 1845 case of Gabbett v Clancy,46 for example, a majority of the Queen’s Bench did not think 
the trial judge’s failure to tell the jury that “unless the Crown was seized of a several fishery 
prior to Magna Carta, they should find for the defendants” amounted to misdirection.47  The 
fishery in question was in the tidal part of the River Shannon and thus in theory subject to the 
public right to fish.  The plaintiffs managed to prove possession and so the public right did not 
apply. 
What is more important is what the decisions have to say about the litigation in question.  
In the 1856 Chancery decision of Allen v Donnelly, the court observed that the litigation over the 
public’s right to fish arose after local newspapers asserted that such rights existed in Lough 
Foyle.  Apparently these newspapers encouraged fund-raising to support the fishermen’s rights.48  
Four years later, the Master of the Rolls delivered a stinging rebuke to the respondents in 
Ashworth v Browne, a case about the fishery between Lough Corrib and the sea including in 
some non-tidal waters.49  The petitioners in Ashworth alleged that “some persons of the humbler 
classes in Galway were in the habit of trespassing upon said fishery, by angling and taking 
salmon and other fish in said river” and asked the court to quiet their title.50  Some of the 
respondents failed to defend their suit, instead they put forward “two paupers” and “supported 
their defence by subscriptions.” This was “a bad example to the lower orders” and evidence of a 
lack of “manliness.”51  The Master of the Rolls also accused the defendants of thinking that 
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“because the petitioners are Englishmen they are not to get justice in Ireland.  This line of 
defence will not succeed in this Court.”52  In short, the public right to fish was set up as an Irish 
right, claimed against English landowners.  The concern over fish stocks may have been 
prompted (at least in part) by the commercial value of salmon and other fish, but as the fisheries 
became privatized the fisheries question took on a markedly nationalistic air.53 Despite the 
nationalistic undertones of the fisheries question, the Irish cases do not seem to be part of any 
unified strategy and the fight over fishing rights was not central to Irish nationalism at this time. 
As it happens, in all of the cases where there was a clash between a claimed public right 
and a claimed private right, the private right won.54  The only case I found where the public right 
succeeded was where a private owner attempted to restrict public fishing as a way of ensuring 
enough salmon reached their fishery.55  That case did not represent two competing claims in one 
location as the other cases did.   
In addition, the vast majority of cases also fail to mention the Fisheries Act (Ireland) and 
its guarantee of public fishing in inland waters.  Two exceptions are Morrissey v Kilkenny,56 and 
the Irish Court of Appeal’s decision in Johnston v O’Neill.57 In Morrissey the defendants stood 
accused of illegally fishing in the River Nore.  Writing for the Court, Justice Lawson relied on 
the common law to ignore the fisheries legislation.  He observed that the “highest authorities” 
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had “settled that use[] by the public, no matter how long, will not confer a right to take fish in 
inland waters…we must construe this section [of the Fisheries Act (Ireland)], having regard to 
the state of the law - the section says that the right must be in the nature of a common of piscary, 
which can only be acquired by grant or prescription; and such a public right as is here claimed, 
based on mere user, cannot, in point of law, exist.”58  Here it is not so much that Parliament had 
gotten the law wrong but that the statute ought to be interpreted in accordance with the common 
law.  Justice Lawson did not explain how such an interpretation worked with the doctrine of 
Parliamentary sovereignty, nor did he explain the difference between “mere user” and 
prescription. Meanwhile in Johnston (CA) the Lord Chancellor of Ireland said, with respect to 
the relevant sections of the Fisheries (Ireland) Act, that “[t]hese sections do not create a right.  
There was a misapprehension as to the law, and a saving was based on that.”59  In short, 
Parliament had gotten the law wrong.   
Leaving aside for a moment the question of why the courts were so hostile to the public 
right to fish, why were the Irish even making the argument?  One potential answer to that 
question lies not with the fisheries legislation but with the pre-conquest legal system of Ireland.  
Under the Brehon laws land was owned by the clan and not by any one individual,60 and the 
same rules applied to govern access to Ireland’s fisheries.61 Ireland’s fisheries pre-conquest were 
not an open commons in the sense that anyone could access the fisheries.  The evidence suggests 
that each clan had a set of rules which governed access to the fisheries.62 Communal access is, of 
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course, much different than public access but given nineteenth-century Irish demographics the 
difference was more semantic than real.  Whether deliberate or not, the fisheries legislation 
tacitly recognised the Brehon laws’ old rule and attempts to assert what were understood by the 
common law as public rights over ‘private’ fisheries harked back to the pre-conquest legal 
system.  Such claims of public right were attempts to repackage an old right for the common law.  
Not surprisingly, the common law proved resistant even in the face of explicit legislation. 
There was, however, a procedural weakness with the way in which the Irish fishing rights 
cases proceeded: that of the jury.  It was for the juries to decide – albeit with judicial direction – 
whether or not there had been a grant of a several fishery or if the ‘acts of ownership’ were 
sufficient.  In a country where the majority of the population was becoming, or seemed to be 
becoming increasingly hostile to British rule, there was a possibility that jury decisions might not 
always be so favourable to private property in the fisheries.  Bad feeling against the British and 
their property law was no secret or rare thing in late-nineteenth-century Ireland and in 1878 the 
danger of juries was brought home to Irish fishing litigation by the House of Lords.  
Bristow emerged out of an action for trespass to a claimed private fishery in Lough 
Neagh.   Lough Neagh is the largest lake by surface area anywhere in the British-Irish Isles and 
is a de facto inland sea.  England’s largest natural lake, Lake Windermere, is a mere sixteen 
square kilometres while Lough Neagh is three-hundred and ninety-two square kilometres.63 To 
put it more simply, the question of whether there should be a public right to fish in inland waters 
had never faced such a large lake as Lough Neagh.  Even if the public right to fish would not be 
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extended to Ireland’s other inland waters, Lough Neagh’s sheer size might give rise to different 
considerations. 
The trespass in Bristow was limited to a place called Fenmore and the plaintiff brought 
the action “for the purpose of establishing a right to a several fishery in the whole of the 
Lough.”64  At trial the judge removed the question of title from the jury by directing that a 
verdict be entered for the plaintiffs.  When the case reached the House of Lords the only question 
for the Court was whether the trial judge had made the right decision: was the question of title 
one of law and thus for the judge, or was it one of fact and so for the jury?65 The Lord Chancellor 
noted that much of the argument had been devoted to the question of whether Lough Neagh was 
subject to the public right to fish but he did not think that question was properly before the 
Court.66 Several of the decisions commented on the interest in the case among the local 
community in Ireland and Lord Blackburn observed that “it appears from the report of the 
learned Judge that the jurymen intimated that, if the question was left for them, they were 
prepared to find a verdict for the Defendants.”67  Such comments echo Silverman’s observation 
from south-eastern Ireland, namely that the private claims over inland fisheries were unpopular 
with the local population.68 
The House of Lords ordered a new trial in Bristow but given Lord Blackburn’s 
observation it should be no surprise that the new trial never happened.  Hence the question of 
public fishing in Lough Neagh remained unanswered.  What those who claimed several fisheries 
in Irish waters needed was some way to remove the decision about title from a jury, a ruling that 
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would turn the question of title from one of fact to one of law.  Such a ruling would eventually 
emerge when the question of title to Lough Neagh returned to the House of Lords in 1911 in 
Johnston v O’Neill.69   
Johnston represents the culmination of the turn-of-the-century Irish fishing rights cases 
not just because it was one of the last from pre-partition Ireland but because it was the case 
where the public right to fish came closest to succeeding. The case centred on the open and 
notorious eel fishing of the appellants who argued that the public had fished in Lough Neagh 
since time immemorial. The reason the case focused on eels and not salmon was the fact that by 
the time the case came to court, Lough Neagh’s salmon fishery had all but collapsed.  A pattern 
which had been repeated, to a greater or lesser extent, across Ireland.70 At the time of the 
decision, there were about eight hundred fishermen supporting roughly three thousand 
individuals by fishing ‘illegally’ in Lough Neagh.71  At trial and on appeal the Irish courts were 
unanimous: there was no such thing as a public right to fish in non-tidal inland waters.  In so 
holding the Irish courts followed the existing Irish jurisprudence which had refused to recognise 
a public right to fish different from that which existed in England. Given the extent of the lower 
courts’ agreement, the House of Lords’ split decision in Johnston surprised the three Law Lords 
who sided with the lower courts.72  It is not clear what prompted such a split but given that the 
case occurred against the backdrop of increasing Irish nationalism, the split in the case went 
along party lines: the majority were all Conservatives, while the minority were all Liberals.  Not 
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surprisingly the Conservatives and Liberals differed in their approach to the Irish question. At 
the risk of oversimplifying, the Conservatives were opposed to Irish Home Rule while the 
Liberals were in favour.73 Equally striking was the extent of the disagreement with the seven 
judgments disagreeing on just about everything it was possible to disagree on with one 
exception: the fact that the public had fished for eels and other fish in Lough Neagh for centuries 
prior to 1911.74 
 Even those Law Lords who felt these fishermen were trespassers agreed that the alleged 
trespass had been going on for a significant time. The sheer extent and length of the fishery cast 
doubt on the respondents’ claims to have had exclusive possession of the Lough Neagh fishery 
since 1605.75  Much as with the earlier fishing rights litigation, the respondents in Johnston used 
a range of evidence in support of their claimed possession. The various grants, leases and similar 
presented to the Court did not agree, at least one was alleged to be a forgery,76 and they all rested 
on the assumption that the Crown had title to Lough Neagh and was thus able to grant it.77 The 
documents were much the same as was presented in Bristow and while in that case the House of 
Lords hinted that they were not much convinced by the evidence they left the final decision to a 
jury.  Not so in Johnston. 
The majority focused their attention on the sufficiency of possession and the 
impossibility of the claimed public right. Lord Macnaghten thought the real issue was not 
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whether the paper title to Lough Neagh was flawless – it clearly was flawed – but whether 
“possession has been held...in accordance with the express terms of the grant”78 and in his view 
the evidence supported the claimed possession.79  Lord Dunedin observed that it although it was 
questionable that the Crown had the fishing rights in Lough Neagh, the fishery had to belong to 
someone as it was “contrary to law” for the fishery to be without an owner.80   
Defective title aside, Lord Dunedin, Lord Macnaghten and Earl Halsbury, agreed that it 
was also impossible in law for the public to acquire any rights to an inland lake.81 Here the 
majority undermined their argument by not including all of Lough Neagh’s fisheries in the 
private fishery claimed by the respondents.  The respondents were only interested in the eel 
fishery and not the ‘pollen’ fishery even though it was “valuable and much sought after in the 
neighbourhood.”82  Lord Macnaghten expressly excluded the pollen fishery from being affected 
by the decision because “there is not...the remotest probability of persons interested in salmon 
fishing or in eel fishing interfering with ...fishing for coarse fish in the lough. For one thing, it 
could not pay to interfere.”83 Calling pollen a ‘coarse fish’ referenced the distinction between 
‘game fish,’ like salmon and trout, which were usually reserved for the gentry, and all other fish 
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of lesser value.84 Moreover, the pollen fishery could not be carried out on the same mass scale as 
eel fishing; it was only useful for subsistence fishing.85   
Yet three of the other Law Lords were not convinced that the respondent had proven 
possession and Lord Ashbourne was only willing to recognise the respondents’ possession over 
part of the Lough.86 In dissent Lord Shaw noted that one of the deeds relied upon by the 
respondents “quite openly and bluntly defies all the formalities relating to the grant of Crown 
properties, and it is frankly founded upon nothing but the will of the Protector [Oliver 
Cromwell].  But I think that the maxim “Stat pro ratione voluntas” [trans: the triumph of will 
over reason] can also be discerned equally as alone lying at the foundations of title in all of the 
Royal grants.”87 So common was this practice that the common law had to devise a way to 
regularize such grants “either constitutionally or legally” through the passage of a statute.88  In 
short, these grants could not and did not grant good title, a further confirmation was needed and 
it was not clear that title to Lough Neagh had ever been adequately confirmed.89  
While the other dissenting judges focused more on the question of possession, Lord Shaw 
was careful to leave room to recognise the unique nature of Lough Neagh and the pre-conquest 
use of the Lough.  Lord Shaw was willing to concede that, due to its size, the lough might be 
subject to the public right to fish.90 In addition, he thought that “there may be much in the history 
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of Ireland....to confirm the view that the transition...from what was practically a tribal society to 
what was practically a feudal system should be accompanied by the conservation of those public 
rights in those waters which...form both a highway and a source of sustenance for the people of 
the country.”91  Although made in a paternalistic fashion, Lord Shaw’s point was correct. 
Lord Robson agreed that Johnston spoke to the Irish situation but he had a different 
explanation for the public’s rights.  For him “The facts …. are consistent with...a license tacitly 
given by...persons whose ancient title has never yet been extinguished by the Crown.”92  The 
point being that the Crown had not succeeded in completely asserting its authority and the pre-
common law legal system was still in effect.  Admittedly, this is a misunderstanding of the 
Brehon Law but it highlights the challenge Johnston posed to the common law and the Crown’s 
authority. 
Johnston and the other Irish cases also threatened the common law’s regime of property 
rights.  In Johnston, Lord Dunedin stated that Lough Neagh simply had to be private property, 93 
meaning the public could only fish as the result of trespass or the tacit permission of the true 
owner.94  The majority in Johnston recognized the injustice their decision would cause but the 
law was the law and could not be altered just “because one sympathizes very much with a large 
class of poor people who are supposed to obtain their living by the exercise of the practice of 
fishing in an area over which they have no legal right to claim the rightfulness of their 
practice.”95 The legitimacy of the fishermen’s claims could not be recognised without tacitly 
suggesting that the common law was potentially illegitimate with respect to Lough Neagh.  The 
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majority held that any rights to or in Lough Neagh must have originated from the Crown for 
them to be recognized by the common law.96  The public could not prove that their rights had 
been granted by the Crown.  As far as the common law was concerned they were trespassers. 
 
IV – Indigenous Rights versus Public Rights 
The story of how the public right to fish came to be exported to Canada, and other former British 
Colonies, is important in and of itself.  Again, due to constraints of space there is not room to 
offer a full history but a few key points are necessary.  The first is that the public right to fish had 
not yet settled into its final form by the time the British conquest of North America began.97 The 
second is that British colonisers, like other European colonisers, did not always respect 
Indigenous claims to North America, a tendency which increased as white settlement increased.  
Indigenous claims are absent from the Canadian case law on the public right to fish until the 
latter half of the twentieth century.  In fact, between 1947 and 1982, no Canadian decision 
appears to have even mentioned the public right to fish.98  The third key point is that the common 
law as received in Canada is not the same as that which existed in England; Canadian courts 
were allowed to and did adapt the law to meet the new circumstances of Canada.99  One of those 
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changes to the common law was the reservation of the beds of navigable waters to the Crown.100  
This reservation was done to uphold the public’s right of navigation and to protect their right of 
fishing in such waters.101  The belief that the public right to fish extended to Canada’s inland 
waters can be seen as far back as 1818 when William Claus, superintendent general of Indian 
affairs, told the Mississauga “that the rivers and forests were open to all and that the 
Mississaugas had an equal right to them.”102 
The initial sharing of the fisheries and other resources ignored Indigenous perspectives on 
whether they had retained any exclusive rights and it broke down when white settlement 
increased.103 It also ignores that Indigenous Peoples may not have understood the fisheries as 
being open commons.  The evidence suggests that Indigenous legal systems had (and still have) 
rules and limits about who could access what fisheries.104  The story of how Indigenous Peoples 
were pushed out of the fishing industry, particularly in British Columbia, is well worn.  Colonial 
officials and white settlers pushed for the fisheries to be opened and the public right to fish 
offered a powerful argument in support of such demands.105   Such displacement was motivated, 
by and large, by the commercial value of the fisheries. In 1982, Aboriginal rights finally received 
explicit constitutional recognition under section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982.106 Such 
                                                 
100
 Sometimes this was done or confirmed by courts, other times by statute. For the latter see, e.g. Bed of Navigable 
Waters Act (1911) 1 Geo V, c 6. For the former see Iverson, supra  note 82; Flewelling, supra  note 99. 
101
 Iverson, supra  note 82 at para 81; Keewatin Power Company v Kenora (Town), 123 OLR 237, 8 OWR 369, 1906 
CarswellOnt 484 at paras 42, 56. 
102
 Robert J Surtees, “Indian Land Cessions in Upper Canada, 1815-1830” in Ian AL Getty & Antoine S Lussier, 
eds, As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian Native Studies (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 1983) 65 at 75. 
103
 See, e.g. Kenny & Parenteau, supra  note 5 at 191-194; Blair, “Settling the Fisheries”, supra  note 5 at 149. 
104
 John Borrows, “Frozen Rights in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the Trickster” (1997) 22:1 Am Indian 
L Rev 37 at 59. 
105
 Newell, supra  note 5; for discussion of Ontario see, e.g., Blair, “Settling the Fisheries”, supra  note 5 at 103. 
106
 I say ‘Aboriginal’ here as that is the term used by the Constitution Act 1982.   
AAM VERSION: DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION 
25 
 
recognition allowed Indigenous Peoples to fight for increased access to Canadian fisheries. It 
was against this background that a cluster of cases referencing the public right to fish emerged. 
After its thirty-five-year absence from the case law, the public right to fish retuned in 
obiter dicta  of Justice La Forest of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal (as he then was).  He 
merely mentioned that the right had existed since “time immemorial” but that did not give it 
special importance.107  Five years later, the Pacific Fishermen’s Defence Alliance (PFDA) 
attempted to rely on the public right to stop the Nisga’a’s land claims agreement.  Justice Dubé 
of the Federal Court rejected the PFDA’s claim, noting that the government had “to determine, 
define, recognize and affirm whatever aboriginal rights existed. It may not ignore them under the 
guise of protecting so-called public fishing rights.”108   
In 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly recognised an Aboriginal right to fish 
for food and recognised an Indigenous priority over the fisheries.109  The Court’s decision in 
Sparrow affirmed that of the British Columbia Court of Appeal which had noted that the federal 
fisheries officials already had a practice of preferring the Indigenous food fishery.110  The day 
after the Supreme Court decided Sparrow, the British Columbia Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Mann v Canada which arose out of an attempt by commercial fishermen to challenge 
the government’s practice of giving Indigenous fishers priority.111 Again the commercial 
fishermen sought to rely on the public right to fish. The decision in Mann did not directly answer 
the question of public fishing given that the decision centred on a lack of jurisdiction but the 
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claimed common law right was found to raise “fundamental constitutional questions.” 112 A year 
later, Justice MacKinnon rejected the Crown’s attempt to strike out an amended statement of 
claim in this litigation.113  Mann does not appear to have ever resulted in a decision on the points 
raised by the commercial fishermen. Nonetheless, it highlights how non-Indigenous fishers were 
attempting to use the public right to fish to protect and justify their access to Canada’s fisheries. 
In 1993, the public right to fish appeared in the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s 
decision in R v NTC Smokehouse. 114 In NTC Smokehouse BCCA, the public right is mentioned 
once with the comment that it cannot be extinguished in tidal waters without federal legislation 
and no such legislation existed.115 In NTC Smokehouse BCCA, the issue was whether or not the 
Sheshaht and Opetchesaht First Nations had exclusive rights over the Somass River as it flowed 
into the Port Alberni inlet. As the river was tidal, the claim of exclusivity failed. 
Although the public right to fish did not appear in the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in 
NTC Smokehouse at the Supreme Court, three other cases decided by the Court that same year 
explicitly or tacitly referenced the public right to fish.  These cases were R v Gladstone, R v 
Nikal¸ and R v Lewis.116 Gladstone was about a fishery in tidal waters to which the Heiltsuk 
claimed an exclusive right, or, more precisely, a right which would have amounted to 
exclusivity. In Gladstone, Chief Justice Lamer’s majority decision incorrectly claimed that the 
public right to fish had existed in the common law since the time of the Magna Carta.   Chief 
Justice Lamer also thought that the constitutional entrenchment of Aboriginal rights could not, 
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did not, and was not meant to extinguish the public’s common law rights.117  The difficulty is not 
so much that the majority erred in their reference to the Magna Carta – this error is rife among 
common law judges – but that they struggled to conceptualize what an exclusive Indigenous 
fishery would look like and how it would interact with the potential rights which might yet be 
recognized of other Indigenous Peoples.  In addition, an exclusive fishery would suggest an 
Indigenous right to fish for commerce, not just for food.  Chief Justice Lamer seemed to think 
that the right to “participate in the commercial fishery” was a right held by Canadians and it was 
only by virtue of being Canadians that the Heiltsuk could participate in the commercial 
fishery.118  
Although he makes the point somewhat awkwardly, what Chief Justice Lamer was trying 
to do was strike a balance between Indigenous rights and the desire of non-Indigenous people to 
access the fishery.  Access to British Columbia’s fisheries is politically sensitive,119 and Chief 
Justice Lamer clearly felt the need to recognize that there had been extensive non-Indigenous 
reliance on BC’s fisheries.  The fact that the Heiltsuk may have exercised exclusive control over 
the fishery prior to British colonization of BC was not entirely irrelevant but it did not mean that 
the Heiltsuk could have an exclusive fishery under the common law, particularly not in tidal 
waters. 
What Nikal and Lewis made clear is that an exclusive Indigenous fishery could not exist 
even where the English common law might have recognised one.  The facts of Nikal and Lewis 
are similar in that both involved fisheries in rivers which were either contained within the 
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boundaries of a reserve or formed the boundary of the reserve, respectively.  Both First Nations 
involved attempted to rely on the common law rules about riparian ownership to assert their 
proprietary right over the fishery.  Under the English common law, as both rivers in question 
were non-tidal, the First Nations could have owned at least part of the river bed and the fisheries 
as riparian owners, unless of course the fisheries or river bed had been expressly excluded in the 
grant of the reserve lands. In both cases the Indigenous fishers attempted to argue that their 
actions were legal because they were in accordance with band bylaws, even though their actions 
violated fisheries legislation.  In both cases, however, the Supreme Court found that the common 
law’s rules about river ownership had never applied in BC.  
In Nikal, the majority claimed that Western Canadian courts had never followed the 
common law rule about ownership of riverbeds with respect to navigable rivers.120  Citing to 
1921 Appeal Court decisions from Manitoba and Alberta, the majority found that the local 
conditions of Western Canada had resulted in a modification of the common law rule so that the 
public had a right to fish in non-tidal navigable waters.121  In addition, the majority also found 
that the Crown had not intended to grant an exclusive fishery to the Wet’suwet’en with respect to 
the Bulkley River.122  The majority said that the Crown’s policy “was to guarantee full public 
access to the fisheries, and to reject any exclusive claims to fishing grounds” including those of 
Indigenous Peoples.123 Not surprisingly the majority referenced the Magna Carta to further 
support the claim that there could be no exclusive fishery;124 the Crown may have attempted to 
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protect some of the fishing grounds for Indigenous Peoples but this was “far different from 
assigning exclusive title to those fishing grounds.”125  
In contrast to Nikal, the river at issue in Lewis formed the boundary to the reserve and 
thus the question was whether or not the ad medium filum acquae rule applied.   Here, Justice 
Iacobucci writing for the Court, distinguished the Privy Council’s decision BC Fisheries because 
it did not deal with a river being used as a boundary.126 Justice Iacobucci also found that the ad 
medium presumption did not apply to navigable rivers in BC.127  Yet it is clear from BC 
Fisheries that fisheries in British Columbia’s rivers, when in non-tidal rivers, had to be the 
subject of property.  In BC Fisheries the Privy Council applied the same common law rules to 
navigable rivers as applied in England: they had to be owned by someone, even if that someone 
was the Crown.128 The decision in BC Fisheries strongly suggests that the Crown’s ownership of 
such rivers would be the same as a private owner and there would be no automatic public right.  
 In Lewis, as the majority did in Nikal, Justice Iacobucci emphasized the historical 
evidence which showed that the Crown did not intend to include the fishery as part of the 
reserve. Nor did the Crown intend to “grant exclusive use of any public waters for the purpose of 
fishing.”129 Here the phrasing “public waters” makes clear that BC’s rivers were always-already 
public, even before Indigenous land claims had been settled.  The public right to fish was not 
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explicitly mentioned in Lewis but it is implicit in the court’s refusal to find an exclusive 
Indigenous right to fish. 
The Supreme Court’s misinterpretation of BC Fisheries and its insistence that the 
common law of Canada was and is different than that of England point to the importance of BC’s 
fisheries.   When BC joined Confederation in 1871 one of the promises the federal government 
made was the “Protection and Encouragement of Fisheries.”130 This promise came roughly 
around the same time that officials in Ontario were turning away from their previous policy of 
granting or recognizing exclusive Indigenous fishing rights in order to grant settlers access to the 
fisheries.131 Not surprisingly, the concern over access to the fisheries was primarily economic.132   
The fact that nineteenth-century Canada, at least initially, lacked the infrastructure such 
as roads and railways linking the nation, made its rivers the de facto highways of the country.  
Understandably the need to keep such rivers open to navigation was essential for the 
development of the Canadian economy.  Canada’s de facto highway system of inland waters did 
not necessarily require as large a deviation from the common law as some Canadian courts 
ultimately made.   Historically the public right of navigation was a question of regulation and did 
not require Crown ownership,133 in fact many English rivers were subject to this right while the 
bed remained in private hands.  Canada was perfectly capable of recognizing such a regulatory-
proprietary divide in its inland waters; the Privy Council relied on this divide in the Provincial 
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Fisheries Reference with respect to who controlled Canada’s inland fisheries: the provinces 
owned them, the federal government regulated them.134  Of course the question of whether or not 
Canada’s inland fisheries were inherently public or inherently private was not settled by that case 
but nor was private ownership of the fisheries completely precluded as later courts seemed to 
think. 
The real issue in Nikal and Lewis is not so much whether tidal, non-navigable waters 
were subject to the public right to fish, but which body had legislative authority over the 
fishery.135  In both cases, the First Nations next to the rivers had issued their own bylaws about 
fishing which conflicted with the fishing regulations issued under the authority of the federal 
Fisheries Act.136  The need for a uniform and centralized system of fisheries regulation is 
important in order to protect against overfishing.137  Yet when the reserves in question were 
created at the end of the nineteenth century, overfishing was not the primary concern, rather it 
was the need to develop these fisheries and protect access for non-Indigenous people.138  
The decisions in Nikal and Lewis relied on the rules about inland waters in order to 
nullify the possibility of First Nations having the all same rights as riparian owners under the 
English common law.  The idea that Canada’s non-tidal, navigable waters were inherently public 
was never explicitly adopted by the Privy Council; it was an idea promoted by various Canadian 
officials because it served to guarantee and justify non-Aboriginal access to valuable fisheries.139  
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If Indigenous Peoples were to continue have access to these fisheries, it would only be at the 
same level as non-Indigenous people, they were to have no special rights.140  Although cloaked 
in the language of equality, this nineteenth-century policy aimed at assimilating Indigenous 
Peoples.  
The Constitution Act, 1982 may have explicitly recognized Indigenous rights but the 
cases of Gladstone, Nikal and Lewis made it clear that these rights do not and cannot include 
exclusive fisheries.  These cases relied on the doubtful  doctrine of the public right to fish and its 
questionable application to all navigable waters in Canada.  Though it is clear that the Supreme 
Court was attempting to balance access to the fisheries and protect the overall integrity of 
Canada’s fishing regulations, it was equally clear that Indigenous rights had to flow from the 
common law.141  The existence of an exclusive Indigenous fishery, in contrast to the accepted 
theory of public access to all navigable waters, pointed to a pre-existing legal system.142  Much 
as with Johnston the issue for these Indigenous fishing rights cases was that the claim made by 
Indigenous Peoples did not and could not originate from the Canadian common law.  The claim 
was understood as contrary to the common law as adopted and adapted in British Columbia and 
much of the rest of Canada.  
Canada’s deviation from the common law of England did two things: first it 
differentiated Canada from England;143 second, it served to preclude exclusive Indigenous 
fisheries.  Both of these are tied with the assertion of a particular national identity and speak to 
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the kind of nation that Canada wished to be.  The Supreme Court’s recognition of Indigenous 
priority of access to certain fisheries sought to reconcile the common law with section 35 of the 
Constitution or perhaps vice versa.  Yet it ultimately fails to grapple with the colonial legacy of 
fisheries’ access.  There is no doubt that the common law could be, should be, and was altered as 
local conditions necessitated and one of the key differentiating features of Canada at the time of 
the common law’s reception was the existence of Indigenous Peoples and their legal traditions.  
That the common law should have been adapted in western Canada in such a way which justified 
and continues to justify the dispossession of Indigenous Peoples is more than a little problematic, 
particularly when the original common law rule would have better protected their rights.  The 
laws, policies, and jurisprudence about access to BC’s fisheries were not based in sound legal 
doctrine; they were and to some extent remain, based on the will of the Canadian government. 
 
V – Fishing Rights and Colonial Dispossession 
The challenge faced by the House of Lords in Johnston and the Supreme Court of Canada in the 
1996 fishing rights cases invoked a de jure dispossession with de facto continued use.  The use in 
both of these situations did not seem to be supported by the common law as received in Ireland 
or Canada.  In Ireland the rule was that all non-tidal waters had to be privately owned and no 
public right could exist therein; at least, that was the rule according to the jurisprudence, 
legislation which suggested otherwise was ignored by the courts.  In Canada, the rule was that all 
navigable waters were subject to the public rights of fishing and navigation, so that the ad 
medium rule did not apply to riparian owners.  Both of these rules, however, emerged not out of 
longstanding legal doctrine consistently applied but out of political attempts to shape the law.  
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The very idea of the public right to fish arose in the seventeenth century as part of a nationalizing 
process, designed to justify a state’s control over its territorial waters.  As shown in section two 
the origins of the public right to fish are much more recent than many judges have since claimed.  
With these questionable origins in mind, this section examines what the courts in Ireland and 
Canada attempted to do in order to reconcile the extra-legal uses of the fisheries with the existing 
law and why they ultimately failed to address longstanding injustices.   
In Johnston several Law Lords attempted to find a way to legally justify and protect the 
Lough Neagh fishermen.  These ways included the pre-existence of their right to fish in the 
lough, the idea that the common law can recognize local customs even if they differ from the 
law, and the argument that the English Crown had never secured title to the Lough and so could 
not grant the fishing there to anyone.  Yet such attempts ultimately failed and the majority of the 
Law Lords held that there could be no public right to fish in Lough Neagh.  Johnston took place 
against the background of increasing pressure on the Lough Neagh eel fishery and the 
preservation of that valuable fishery played an important role in the litigation.  So too did the 
protection of common law property rights play an important role in the decisions of the majority. 
Lord Macnaghten’s observation that every title in Ulster was stolen coupled with his refusal to 
address such historic wrongs points to the old common law preference for longstanding 
possession.144  In fact the ultimate ratio of Johnston, and one of the reasons for which it is cited 
by subsequent cases is its holding about what kind of possession is sufficient to cure defects in 
title.145 
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Although Earl Halsbury stated that sympathy for poor people was not a good reason to 
alter the law,146 the others in the majority attempted to leave some room for the public fishery, 
albeit at a smaller scale. Lord Macnaghten said that the fishers should have stuck to line fishing 
and not used nets, a claim that Lord Robson then debunked by arguing that the use of nets was 
longstanding.147 Lord Macnaghten also held that it was fine for the fishers to continue to fish for 
pollan.148 Lord Dunedin seemed to agree that public fishing for pollan was acceptable, in part 
because it could never be profitable for a private owner.149  The problem is that leaving the 
pollan fishery alone made it clear that the real issue was not that the public fishing was illegal but 
that it was bad for the respondents’ commercial eel fishery.  The room that the majority left for 
the fishers was that which was not valuable; the fishers could survive but they could not profit.   
The Supreme Court of Canada did not work quite so hard to find a way to protect the 
Indigenous fishers in Gladstone, Nikal and Lewis.  No justice advanced the argument that there 
was an exclusive Indigenous right to fish in these cases.  The Supreme Court did recognize an 
Indigenous priority over access to the fisheries at issue, but this priority stemmed from their right 
to fish for food and did not extend to cover profit.150  Such a divide between fishing for food and 
fishing for commercial value overlooks the fact that Indigenous Peoples might well need to trade 
some fish in order to afford the tools and materials necessary to preserve the rest of their catch.151  
This puts Indigenous fishers, particularly subsistence fishers in a bit of a bind though, 
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presumably, so long as they merely traded fish for the items they needed and did not receive 
cash, this would not count as ‘commerce’ as per Gladstone.152 Granted, subsequent jurisprudence 
has left more room for the Indigenous right to fish to include some rights to sell, but this will not 
extend to an unlimited commercial fishery.153 As in Johnston, the fishers claiming the right 
contrary to the common law might be allowed to fish but their profit will be limited, and their 
fishing must be in accordance with the national fisheries regime.  Unlike Johnston, which 
examined the origins of private title to Lough Neagh, the Supreme Court of Canada never 
examined where the Crown got its title to the various fisheries from; a question all the more 
pressing for large parts of BC which remain formally unceded territory.154  
Ultimately it would seem that the key to Johnston and the 1996 Indigenous fishing rights 
cases is not so much the question of what the law actually is but who gets access to what 
resources and under what law.  Attempts to legally justify the decisions in the nineteenth-century 
Irish fishing rights cases and the late 1990s Canadian Indigenous fishing rights cases fail.  There 
are compelling legal arguments as to why the outcome for both should have been different: either 
the existence of a statute protecting public fishing in inland waters; or jurisprudence supporting 
the idea that inland fisheries could be privately owned, to say nothing of constitutional 
protections for Indigenous rights.  These alternative arguments would have also been the 
situation, by and large, prior to the reception of the English common law in both Ireland and 
Canada.  The arrival of the English common law and settlers altered the legal landscape and, for 
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whatever reason, in both Ireland and much of Canada the common law usurped any and all pre-
existing legal systems and was deemed equally applicable to everyone.155  It was never the case 
that Irish people or Indigenous Peoples were completely prohibited from the fishery in their 
respective countries, merely that they could only access it in the same ways as everyone else 
under the common law.  
The problem in both of these examples is not merely a question of sharing the physical 
space but also a question of who gets to share in the benefits of the land: who owns which 
resources and why?  In Ireland the answer was that fisheries were privately owned in non-tidal 
waters; but in Canada the answer is quite different, with public ownership (or assumed public 
ownership) being the norm not just with respect to fisheries but with respect to oil and gas as 
well.156  The Canadian situation may seem to be more democratic but it cannot be more just if 
this public ownership fails to account for the continued existence of Indigenous rights and laws 
for accessing the fisheries.    
The balancing done in Johnston and the recognition of Indigenous priority over BC’s 
fisheries are judicial attempts to find a way for everyone to share in the fishery, insofar as the 
fishery allows.  Yet this balancing falls short simply because it does not recognize the actual 
facts or the law.  It is clear that the public had fished for eels since time immemorial in Lough 
Neagh and it is also clear that in many parts of Canada, Indigenous Peoples were granted an 
                                                 
155
 This was not always the case with respect to settler-Aboriginal relations, at least in North America, see Katherine 
Hermes, ““Justice Will Be Done Us:” Algonquin Demands for Reciprocity in the Courts of European Settlers” in 
Christopher L Tomlins & Bruce H Mann, eds, The Many Legalities of Early America  (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 
2001) 123 (noting that initially Aboriginal people were able to keep their own legal traditions with minimal 
interference from European Colonizers). It was also not the case with Quebec which successfully fought to retain its 
own legal system. 
156
 David H Breen, Alberta’s Petroleum Industry and the Conservation Board (Edmonton: University of Alberta 
Press, 1993) at 4. 
AAM VERSION: DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION 
38 
 
exclusive fishery and have continued to act as though they have an exclusive fishery.157 The 
balancing is also problematic because it does not hear and cannot hear the echoes of pre-common 
law legal orders. Consequently, whether intentionally or not, the decisions examined in this 
paper repeat the dispossession and conquest of previous centuries.    
Of course, overfishing must be guarded against and it seems likely that a centralized form 
of control is the best way to do this.  Such centralized regulatory control does not require the 
fishery to be publicly owned; it does and will have an impact on the property rights of those who 
own fisheries but it will not necessarily abolish that property.158  Nor would the recognition of an 
exclusive Indigenous fishery completely abolish the public right to fish – however doubtful the 
origins of the public right may be – public fisheries can and do coexist alongside private 
fisheries.159 Centralized control could also potentially leave room for Indigenous law to shape 
access to the fisheries thought that would require the federal government to work with 
Indigenous people and take Indigenous laws seriously. 
In Ireland, Johnston has proven to be the last word on whether or not public fishing rights 
could exist in non-tidal waters.160  The 1996 cases of Gladstone, Nikal and Lewis do not have to 
be the last word with whether or not there can be an exclusive Indigenous fishery in Canada’s 
non-tidal, navigable waters, or even in its tidal waters.  The public right to fish is an accepted 
common law right, even if it is not as longstanding as the courts think, but the right is not 
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absolute and it can be altered.  There is no legal reason why exclusive Indigenous fisheries could 
not exist along sections of the Canadian coast or in inland waters, if anything this would be the 
recognition of a longstanding custom – something the common law has always been able to 
do.161  In other words, it is open for the courts to recognize such a fishery or for such a fishery to 
be ‘granted.’162 The recognition of Indigenous priority over the fisheries has created a new right 
under the common law but this is a relatively limited right and it is one which seeks to divide 
fishing for subsistence from fishing for commercial gain.  As such Indigenous priority over the 
fisheries is an example of the ‘frozen rights’ problem which limits rights claims to what was 
integral to Indigenous cultures.163 
 
VI – Conclusion 
The jurisprudence on the public right to fish offers a case study of the ways in which the law can 
be both a tool for resisting and enforcing colonialism and the role that the courts have to play in 
such battles.  In Ireland and Canada, the courts understood the law as incapable of recognising 
the claims advanced.  In the former, there simply could not be any public rights in inland waters; 
while in the latter, there simply had to be public rights in inland waters.  The fact that there was a 
statute protecting public fishing rights in Ireland and that the law was not as consistent as the 
Canadian courts claimed, did not seem to matter if it even featured in the decisions.  Insofar as 
both the Irish and Canadian cases tacitly invoked pre-common law legal systems, they did so in 
terms which the common law could have recognised as its own: statute, or the ad medium 
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presumption.  In not recognising these claims, the courts reconfirmed the colonial dispossession 
which formed the backdrop to the litigation in both Ireland and Canada.   
 A comparison of the jurisprudence on fishing rights in both countries highlights the ways 
in which the common law can change to fit new conditions.  Yet the changes that the common 
law courts have been willing to recognise are ones which fit within the broader pattern of 
colonial goals; of defending private property and protecting commerce.  In Ireland the courts 
refused to extend the public right to fish to inland waters because that conflicted with the 
common law of England. In contrast, Canadian courts have consistently upheld the public’s right 
to fish in inland waters and have refused to find an exclusive Indigenous right to fish, even where 
the common law as it applied in England would have found such an exclusive right.  The courts’ 
willingness to recognise ‘deviations’ from the English common law rule, have not been done to 
recognise the different conditions which existed in Ireland and Canada, but are often motivated 
by the outcome which best suited colonial interests. 
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Appendix: Chronological Table of Public Fishing Rights Cases 
Case Name Year Country 
Gabbett v Clancy (1845), [1844] 8 Ir L Rep 299 (QB) 1845 Ireland 
Allen v Donnelly, [1856] 5 Ir Ch R 229 1856 Ireland 
Ashworth v Brown (1860), 10 Ir Ch R 421 1860 Ireland 
Malcomson v O'Dea (1863), 11 ER 1155, 10 HL Cas 593 1863 Ireland 
Johnston v Bloomfield, [1867] IRCL 68 1867 Ireland 
Murphy v Ryan, [1867] 2 IRCL 143 (CP) 1867 Ireland 
Chricton v Collery (1870), 4 IRCL 508 1870 Ireland 
Wyse v Leahy (1875), 9 IRCL 384 1875 Ireland 
Bristow v Cormican (1878), 3 AC 641 (HL) 1878 Ireland 
Morrissey v Kilkenny (1884), 14 IR 349 1884 Ireland 
Reference re Provincial Fisheries, [1898] AC 700, 1898 
CarswellNat 41 
1898 Canada 
Keewatin Power Company v Kenora (Town), 123 OLR 237, 1906 
CarswellOnt 484 
1906 Canada 
O'Neill v Johnston (1908), [1909] 1 IR 237 (CA) 1908 Ireland 
Ireland (AG) v Fleming, [1911] 1 IR 323 (Chanc Div) 1911 Ireland 
Johnston v O'Neill, [1911] AC 552 1911 Ireland 
Flewelling v Johnston, 16 Alta LR 409, [1921] 2 WWR 374 
(SC(AD)) 
1921 Canada 
In re Iverson and Greater Winnipeg Water District, 31 Man R 98, 
[1921] 1 WWR 621 
1921 Canada 
Reference re British Columbia Fisheries, [1913] UKPC 63, 1913 
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